Abstract. In the paper, the first Finnish computer construction, previously claimed to have resulted only to an out-dated machine, is studied as an integral part of an attempt to establish a national computer center in Finland. The argument is that the aim of the Finnish Committee for Mathematical Machines (1954Machines ( -1960 was more similar to its Swedish and Danish counterparts than has been realized before even though the Finnish Committee decided to duplicate a German G1a computer in 1954. This similarity is because during its first two years the Committee for the first time tried to establish a national computing center, like the ones in Stockholm and Copenhagen, in Helsinki. Furthermore, it was because of the politically and economically difficult situation in post-war Finnish society that this plan for the national computing center, or the building of a single computer, the ESKO, did not gain the support it needed either from the state nor the former punched card machine users. In the uncertain economic year 1956, the Finnish punched card customers of IBM decided to continue collaborating only with IBM. Moreover, IBM also benefited by receiving expert work force educated in the Committee's computer construction project. Hopefully this Finnish case, being unsuccessful and therefore different from other Scandinavian countries, can also assist in further comprehending preconditions to more successful developments like the ones in Sweden and Denmark.
Introducing the Computer in Finland 1
In Finland the first, national computer construction project was started in 1955  that is concurrently with the Danish one but years later than the Swedish or Norwegian construction 2 . Unlike in other Scandinavian countries, the Finnish project leaders had in 1954 chosen to duplicate a German computer. In 1960, the construction work was, finally, ended up with what contemporaries saw as an out-dated machine, the ESKO 3 . What also contributed to this judgment was that in 1958, International Business Machines (IBM) had imported the first operational computer to Finland. By this operation IBM also claimed to be the initiator of modern computing in the country, thus competing with the national computer construction project. Consequently, IBM dominated the computer market in Finland in the end of the 1950's and in the 1960's. 4 Some of the Finnish computing professionals have regarded the first computer construction as an unsuccessful effort -or seen it even as irrelevant. Retrospectively, the computing professionals have criticized the Finnish Committee for Mathematical Machines, Matematiikkakonekomitea, (established in 1954) for choosing a German computer to be copied in Finland. The computing professionals have argued that selecting a machine that used punched tape as a storage for the program was a bad choice because the newest computers had their program stored in a memory already at the time, 1954. 5 It has mainly been the computing professionals who have studied history of computing in Finland so far. In this paper, my main argument is that their understanding of the ESKO project has been far too machine-and producer-centered. By focusing on the outcome of the ESKO project, the computing professionals have been unable to understand other motives and plans that the members of the Finnish Committee had, not just the building of a single computer. Studies from 1 A draft version of this text has earlier been presented as a paper for the session, "Computers for Scandinavian Modernization", at the Annual Meeting of the Society for the History of Technology in San Jose, USA, in October 2001. The paper is for the most part based on my licentiate dissertation P. Paju My intention is to analyze the construction of the ESKO computer mainly as a social process. 9 This means I will study how the Finnish Committee for Mathematical Machines tried to build not only a technological artifact but also social structures, and how the interaction that resulted in turn shaped the Committee. In this paper, I will focus on the first two years, 1954-1956, of the Finnish Committee for Mathematical Machines and on the beginning of the construction of the ESKO computer. Leaning on archival material I will explore how the Finnish group went to Germany for acquiring a computer and why the decision to copy a German computer was not supposed to be so important a choice. 10 My argument is that the aim of the Finnish Committee was more similar to its Swedish and Danish counterparts than has been acknowledged. I think this is because during its first two years the Committee, adapting the model of Swedish computing center, for the first time tried to establish a national computing center in Helsinki.
11 Furthermore, I argue that it was because of the politically and economically difficult situation in post-war Finnish society that this plan for the national computing center (or the building of the ESKO) did not gain the support it needed.
Moreover, I argue that, despite its outcome, the ESKO project may have had a strong positive influence as an educational project in an environment not yet devoted to the problems of information technology. Not only were the first computer experts in Finland trained during this 9 The technical details of the ESKO are therefore not central to this paper. Some main things should be noted however. The ESKO was essentially an electron tube computer. It had no internal memory for the program but the program was read from paper tapes. The paper tapes also served as input media. There was also a drum memory for the number data. The operational speed of the ESKO was 20 additions per second. Altogether the ESKO had many special features and solutions that where tried out but I will, if that is hoped for, return to these in my presentation in construction project but also IBM Finland responded to the competition generated by the Committee and pressure from customers, by offering the "punched card men" 12 courses on new technology. Later, IBM became the largest computer supplier in the country when computers were utilized in modernizing Finnish society towards a welfare state in the 1960's.
Limited Funding in 1954: Why Not a German Computer?
In the 1940's, Finland was in no position to acquire a computer of its own. The country, which at that time had a population of four million people, had suffered heavily from the two wars that it waged against the Soviet Union during the period of the Second World War. After the war ended, Finland was not occupied but had to pay heavy war reparations to the Soviet Union. Those debts were completed in 1952, also the year of the Helsinki Summer Olympic Games. In the Cold War period, Finland found itself in a difficult situation between the western and the eastern block and, simultaneously, foreign policy relations with the Soviet Union created political battles and uncertainty in the country. 13 This, often unstable, political and economic situation, and lack of tradition in science policy, prevented investment in science and technology in Finland which was still mostly an agrarian society in the beginning of the 1950's. The scarce resources for scientific work in Finland led many ambitious Finnish graduates to emigrate, mostly to Sweden and the United States. It can be said that there was no science policy in Finland, only the policies of some individual scientists in high positions who belonged to the Academy of Finland -so it was a very different situation than, for example, in Sweden. The members of the Committee had many reasons for wanting a computer in the country. The most obvious reason was that a computer would be beneficial for scientific work in Finland. Some members of the Committee had already been able to use the Swedish computers for their calculations, but a computer in Helsinki would be very welcome. Professor Laurila preferred to have his engineers trained in digital computing technology so that they would be able to establish a computing center in Finland. Finally, the military wanted to calculate tables for the Ballistics Office quicker and cheaper. 18 It was the chairman, Nevanlinna, who dominated when the Committee chose a German computer. The chairman was offered a design of a computer to copy from Göttingen, Germany.
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That offer came as a surprise also to Professor Laurila. The Committee had first decided that Laurila should explore alternatives for acquiring a computer, whether to purchase or to build one. While Laurila made inquiries, the chairman Nevanlinna visited his old university town in West Germany, Göttingen, in the summer of 1954. Nevanlinna was very excited about the new machines but was a theoretical mathematician who had defended his doctoral thesis a long time before (1919). Without exaggeration, he had only poor knowledge of computer technology when his friends and colleagues in the Max-Planck Institut für Physik in Göttingen offered him a blueprint of their newly planned small, scientific, digital computer, the G1a, so that the machine would be copied without charge in Finland. 20 The German computer differed somewhat from what Professor Laurila thought was favorable but he had no better, that is, less expensive, suggestion. An important advantage was that the Laurila. His papers are at present in the National Archives of Finland. Regarding the proposal, see Anders Carlsson's paper. 16 From now on I will use the term computer for its brevity. Germans planned to complete this small machine after one and a half years' construction work. It was this tight timetable that made Laurila content himself with this German project as a learning process for his students, the engineers.
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The German alternative was by no means the only one though. Professor Laurila had already sent two of his young engineers, Hans Andersin and Tage Carlsson, who both had Swedish as their mother tongue, to study computing in Matematikmaskinnämnden in Stockholm. Returning from their short stay in Sweden autumn 1954, Andersin and Carlsson were able to report their Professor that the Royal Swedish Academy of Engineering Sciences could offer the blueprints of the BESK computer for free to the Finnish Committee. 22 However, the Committee then calculated that to build such a large machine would be too expensive (the German alternative would cost only one fifth of the expense of the BESK). Also, they argued that in Finland there would not be enough needs and users for such an efficient computer like BESK even in the near future. The young Finnish engineers would have preferred to copy the BESK; for them it was, of course, an up-to-date computer, but after some protests they accepted that they would copy the Göttingen computer G1a. After all, it would only take a year and a half to complete the G1a also in Helsinki, they thought.
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This selection process is partly explained by a gap between generations. For scientists from Nevanlinna's generation in Finland, Germany still represented superiority in technical knowhow. For more practical engineers like Professor Laurila, who knew better, this Germanmindness was something from the past that could not be avoided in the Finland of the 1950's. 24 Nevertheless, the Finns must also have been impressed by the first Göttingen machine, the G1 -at that time the only such machine operating in Germany -that had already been used successfully for two years by 1954 25 . A German constructor, Wilhelm Hopmann (1924 Hopmann ( -2002 , planned to build the G1a -computer as a follow-up version to the G1 computer. 26 Hopmann designed the G1a as a "minimal machine"; a construction that would need only a minimal number of parts and would still be of use to scientists of various disciplines. 27 What the Finns, Nevanlinna and Laurila, did not know when opting to copy the German G1a, was that the blueprint was still under development at that time -and it would take much longer than they thought in 1954 to complete this complex minimal construction. 
The Committee's Aim: a National Computing Center
The Committee's decision to build a computer in Finland cannot be understood without paying attention to the larger vision of computer use that was developed in the Committee. It seems that, right from the start in 1954, the Committee, and especially Professor Laurila, intended not only to have a computer built but, and maybe more importantly at least for Laurila, they tried to create a national computing center in Helsinki, the capital of Finland. Already when the two engineers who were going to build the computer were studying computer technology in Göttingen in the winter of 1955, in one of his letters Laurila wrote that he would like to appoint the other scholarship holder, Hans Andersin, as manager of this future computer center. 28 This plan to establish a computing center in Finland was elaborated on the following year, 1955, after engineers had begun the construction work of the Finnish G1a, the ESKO, 29 in Helsinki. The Committee wanted to take responsibility firstly for not only the whole scientific calculating work but also for all computer calculation work in Finland, secondly for education in the new field of computing, and thirdly also for research and development work in computer machinery. The Committee desired to have customers such as the state, scientists and industry. 30 Especially for the scientists, whom the members of the Committee knew best, this center would have meant an enormous improvement in calculating capacity and plenty of new possibilities for research in areas that had been underdeveloped in Finland, such as the atomic research 31 . The members of the Committee realized that in order to materialize this plan, they needed support from the would-be-customers of the computing center. Perhaps the most important group was the punched card men, the leaders of punched card installations in various organizations, who had formed an association (the Punched Card Association) for themselves in 1953 in order to better negotiate with the largest supplier, IBM.
32 After constructing the ESKO for half a year in Finland and looking forward to completing the machine the following year, the Committee decided to suggest cooperation with the punched card men.
A representative from the Finnish Committee for Mathematical Machines, Dr Kari Karhunen, 33 suggested to the annual meeting of the Punched Card Association in 1955 that there should be a joint effort to create a computing center in the country. This center could then buy a large, general purpose, electronic computer there for all to use. 34 What Dr Karhunen did not mention aloud was that this center would in the beginning probably benefit mostly Finnish scientists in providing them with modern calculation equipment that the universities could not afford. For the punched card men a computing center did not seem such an attractive idea. At least no signs of supporting this suggestion on a large scale are to be found in the journal they published -although they reported at great length about the meeting in question. 35 After studying the punched card machinery they used, one can conclude that this center-like, centralized organization was not a preferred way for them to use new electronic machines -they were more eager to buy computers of their own in order to automate their punched card machine organizations. What they needed was more and faster data processing capacity that was essentially reliable for their businesses. 36 It may be that the punched card men also thought that their needs for a computing center were very different from what the scientific members of the Committee represented. Thus the punched card men would only marginally benefit from the center. Perhaps also the fact that the ESKO, the first computer to be used in the computer center, would be a scientific computer contributed to this opinion of the punched card men although most members of the scientific Committee did not want to send that message with building of the ESKO. Furthermore, these parties, one mostly of business people and the other of scientists, had no tradition in cooperation.
At the same time IBM Finland presented the punched card men a future option for a computer of their own, the new middle-sized computer IBM 650. The company had in the summer of 1955 begun marketing their Electronic Data Processing Machines to their punched card customers. 37 Also the military did not invest its limited resources in the new and risky computer technology, but instead they purchased a punched card installation (delivered in 1955 or 1956) from IBM. 38 In addition, this Committee's initiative of establishing a computing center suffered a setback in early 1956 when the economic situation in the country deteriorated suddenly and dramatically. In the spring of 1956 the country faced a general strike. This crisis and the recession that followed, made all prospective computer users, that is the large and growing organizations using punched card machinery, postpone their purchases. 39 Why did this national computing center not receive more support from the state? The fact is that the state in Finland had made heavy investments to industrialize in the 1950's. These investments were supposed to stabilize the economy in order to maintain the country as (economically) independent a neighbor of the Soviet Union as possible. In the 1950's and 1960's, Finland was in the process of transformation from an agrarian society into an industrial one -this happened later and faster than in its neighbor Sweden and other Western countries 40 . The prime minister from the Agrarian party, Urho Kekkonen, who in 1956 became President of Finland and remained so for 25 years, had in the first half of the 1950's launched a program for investing in modern industries in order to increase employment among the growing population. Essential for industrialization was energy supply. The building of large technological projects such as power plants, oil refineries and factories urgently needed public funding but this left practically no attention or funding for the new computer technology from the state. The ruling politicians did not see computers as helpful in their crucial effort to protect the country from growing Soviet influence, which was the hidden purpose for creating jobs for the Finnish people by industrializing the country in the 1950's. 41 However, possibly the worst setback for the national computing center plan was that in 1956 the completion date of the ESKO computer was delayed (for the first time). Building the minimal machine in Göttingen proved to be more demanding and costly than could have been imagined. Also in Finland this delay in construction work led to additional financial difficulties. Consequently the Computing Center could not start its service. Instead, soon after the first delay, the Committee lost one of its two original employees to IBM.
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A Beneficial Failure, or Educational Effects
Historians of technology have (in recent years) focused attention on failures in technological development work. For example Graeme Gooday has noted that technological failures (and therefore also successes) have their own interpretative flexibility since technologies in themselves don't fail but are interpreted so by various people. 43 This seems to be the case also with the 'failure' of the ESKO computer. Certainly the ESKO was not completed according to schedule. It clearly did not fulfill all of the Committee member's and the engineer's expectations. But in the context of the plans for the national computer center the ESKO project looks different. What really failed were the Committee's plans for the center and thus their attempt to govern the development of computer technology in Finland. Nevertheless this failure had its positive effects too.
The major impact of building the ESKO computer was educational: during its construction the first computer specialists were trained in Finland. 44 Furthermore, as a reaction to the Committee, Finnish IBM offered courses on the new technology to the punched card men from 1955 onwards. 45 These responses from IBM also continued in the economically uncertain situation in 1956 and after. This new IBM policy made the future customers for computer suppliers, the punched card men, decide to wait for the electronic data processing machines go down in price and collaborate with IBM Finland rather than with the Committee of scientists. Under the Committee the construction work for the ESKO computer seemed to continue for years and years.
Additionally, IBM Finland also hired the two central employees who had been working for the Finnish Committee for Mathematical Machines. These men became the first computer experts in the company and soon advanced to key positions there, responsible for computer sales. 46 It can be summarized that through expert education IBM Finland was the one that benefited mostly, together with individuals, from the unsuccessful academic computer construction project in Finland. In the 1960's IBM became the largest computer supplier in the market.
Also another company received expert work force from the ESKO project. The Finnish constructor of the ESKO moved to a company named Kaapelitehdas, the Cable factory. 47 It was the same company that had also started a similar computing center with the one that the scientific Committee had planned in mid-1950's. This computing center later evolved into the Electronics Department of the Nokia Company.
In sum, it can be argued that in important aspects like education on the part of the scientific Committee and increased collaboration with IBM on the part of punched card machinery users, these actors from the 1950's paved the way for computers to enter Finland. This happened first at the end of 1958 (in the state-owned Post-Office Bank) and then in rapidly growing numbers in the 1960's 48 .
Conclusion
In this paper, I have presented the beginnings of the first computer construction project in Finland by scrutinizing the solutions and proposals made by the Finnish Committee for Mathematical Machines in attempting to shape the new computer technology in Finland in 1954-56. Knowing the limited funds for scientific research, the Committee decided to copy a computer from Germany in 1954. This construction project was meant to be only the start of establishing a national computing center according to the model provided by the Swedish computing center. The Finnish punched card men, the would-be-customers for the planned computing center, however, preferred to collaborate with IBM in Finland. In the recession that began in 1956, this decision to negotiate mainly with IBM was strengthened. The initiative for the computing center was left unsupported 1956 because at the same time the state was forced to invest in industrializing the country to maintain independence from Soviet influence. Thus this paper argues that the first Finnish computer construction should not be seen only as an engineering project but it should be set into the context of a social, or better socio-technical, effort to establish a national computing center by the Finnish Committee for Mathematical Machines in the mid-1950's. This wider view may help us to better understand the difficulties and outcomes of the ESKO project that ended in 1960 after construction work had faced several delays. In addition, I suggest seeing this whole ESKO project not as a failure but as an important learning process where a group of Finnish engineers started to learn and study computer technology for the first time. At the same time it is clear that the Finnish Committee had its weaknesses (like the resources and the material linkage to Germany) and it failed to gain support and to establish a computing center. All in all, the Finnish IBM mastered the change from punched card machines to computer technology far better than the scientific committee. In this change, as I have demonstrated, the punched card men played a significant role by preferring to collaborate with IBM. Thus this case reinforces the importance of studying the roles that users have in the processes of shaping technology into a society.
[One more point to this for the discussions in Barcelona. It would be interesting to explore and compare the 1950's punched card associations in different European countries and their relations to IBM nationally (and also their relations to the scientific computing in these countries). Further, it would be interesting to study the IBM's strategy and roles in the north as a Scandinavian actor (or the IBM as one actor in Central European level, or European.). I especially welcome all ideas and literature hints concerning these topics.]
Moreover, this view of the social construction of computer technology and the interactions of these different actors in shaping of that technology informs us about the modernization process in post-war Finland. It seems that modernization meant mostly industrialization and it was not until the 1960's that computers became a key element in the modernization of Finnish society and building welfare state structures. Thus, differences in modernization between Finland on the one hand and Sweden and Denmark on the other should also be analyzed by comparing early computer projects in these countries.
